New York

Personal injury and property damage claims must be filed within three years of accrual under CPLR § 214(4)-(5). This is the default period for negligence-based tort claims in New York. Medical malpractice operates on a shorter window: two years and six months from accrual or last continuous treatment under CPLR § 214-a, with the continuous treatment doctrine tolling accrual while treatment for the same condition continues with the same provider.

Wrongful death claims must be filed within two years of date of death under EPTL § 5-4.1. New York's two-year wrongful death period is shorter than its three-year personal injury period, creating a procedural trap when injury and death are separated in time. The underlying personal injury claim may remain viable while the derivative wrongful death claim has already expired.

Breach of contract claims, both written and oral, must be filed within six years of breach under CPLR § 213(2). New York applies the same six-year period to both written and oral contracts, an unusually long period compared to most states. The UCC governs sale-of-goods contracts under a four-year period from breach (UCC § 2-725).

Fraud claims operate on a dual deadline under CPLR § 213(8): six years from commission of the fraud, or two years from discovery, whichever is later. The discovery rule provides relief in latent fraud cases where the fraudulent conduct was not reasonably discoverable until later.

Intentional torts (assault, battery, defamation, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, intentional infliction of emotional distress) must be filed within one year under CPLR § 215. This shortened period requires accelerated intake for defamation and intentional tort matters, where the standard three-year tort period does not apply.

Tolling provisions appear in CPLR § 208 (infancy and insanity) and CPLR § 207 (defendant's absence from New York). Notice of Claim requirements against municipalities, public benefit corporations, and the State of New York impose additional procedural deadlines that operate alongside these SOL periods. Missing either the Notice of Claim deadline or the SOL deadline can bar the claim independently of the other.

New York follows pure comparative fault. Under CPLR § 1411, a plaintiff's recovery is diminished in proportion to their share of fault but not barred regardless of percentage. A plaintiff found 99 percent at fault still recovers one percent of their damages. The pure comparative framework was adopted by statute in 1975, replacing the prior contributory negligence rule.

Apportionment requires the jury to allocate fault among all parties, including any settled or absent tortfeasors, with separate verdict findings. This applies even when a defendant has settled and is no longer in the case at trial. The fault percentages must sum to 100 percent across all parties found to bear any responsibility for the injury.

CPLR Article 16 (§§ 1601-1602) governs several liability for non-economic damages on a 50-percent threshold. When a defendant is found 50 percent or less at fault, that defendant's liability for non-economic damages is several only and limited to its proportionate share. When a defendant is found more than 50 percent at fault, that defendant remains jointly and severally liable for all non-economic damages.

Economic damages (medical expenses, lost wages, property damage) remain jointly and severally liable in all cases regardless of fault percentage. The Article 16 several-liability rule applies only to non-economic damages such as pain and suffering, emotional distress, and loss of consortium.

CPLR § 1602 enumerates significant exceptions where joint and several liability is preserved even for non-economic damages, including motor vehicle accidents, certain product liability claims, intentional acts, hazardous substance and environmental harm claims, certain medical malpractice claims, and matters involving employees acting within the scope of employment. Practitioners must consult § 1602 for the full list of exceptions when evaluating apportionment exposure in a given matter.

General Municipal Law § 50-e applies to municipalities, school districts, public benefit corporations, and most local governmental entities. The Notice of Claim must be served on the appropriate party within 90 days of accrual. The notice must be sworn to by the claimant and contain the claimant's name and address, the nature of the claim, the time when and place where the claim arose, the manner in which the claim arose, and the items of damage or injury claimed.

Failure to timely serve the Notice of Claim is generally fatal to the underlying claim. The 90-day deadline is strictly enforced and cannot be extended by ordinary stipulation between the parties. Service must be made on the entity identified in the underlying claim, not on a related party or affiliate, with proper service mechanics under the applicable statute.

Late notice may be permitted under GML § 50-e(5) on motion to the court within one year and ninety days of accrual. Courts apply discretionary factors including the reason for delay, prejudice to the municipality, and whether the municipality had actual knowledge of the underlying events. Late notice is not granted as of right, and many late-notice motions are denied where the moving party cannot establish a credible reason for the delay or where prejudice to the municipality is shown.

Following Notice of Claim service, GML § 50-h authorizes the municipality to examine the claimant under oath within 90 days of service. The examination covers the facts and circumstances of the claim. Suit generally cannot be commenced until the examination has occurred or the 90-day window has passed. Practitioners frequently err by filing suit too early after Notice of Claim service, before the § 50-h examination window has run.

For claims against the State of New York or state agencies, the Court of Claims Act controls. Section 10(3) requires a Notice of Intention to File Claim within 90 days of accrual, with the formal claim filed within two years for personal injury or breach of contract and three years for property damage. Section 10(2) imposes a 90-day notice and two-year filing window for wrongful death claims. Claims against the State are filed in the Court of Claims, which has exclusive jurisdiction over money damage claims against the State of New York.

The Notice of Claim and Notice of Intention requirements operate alongside the underlying SOL periods rather than replacing them. A plaintiff must meet both deadlines to preserve the claim. Missing either deadline can bar the claim independently of the other. Strict compliance is the rule and courts apply these requirements rigorously, with limited exceptions for late notice under GML § 50-e(5) and equitable estoppel doctrines where the municipality has affirmatively induced the delay.

New York's anti-SLAPP framework spans three provisions. Civil Rights Law § 76-a defines the substantive scope of "actions involving public petition and participation." Civil Rights Law § 70-a provides the damages cause of action available to defendants who successfully defend against a SLAPP. CPLR § 3211(g) and § 3212(h) supply the procedural mechanics through accelerated motion practice with a mandatory discovery stay.

The 2020 amendments to New York's anti-SLAPP law (S52A/A5991A, effective November 2020) dramatically broadened the statute's scope. Before 2020, the law applied narrowly to actions arising from "public petition" related to applications for governmental permits, licenses, and similar approvals. The 2020 amendments expanded coverage to any "communication in a place open to the public or a public forum in connection with an issue of public interest." Courts have construed "public interest" broadly under the amended framework, bringing within scope commercial speech, online reviews, journalism, and many forms of commentary that the prior narrow statute would not have covered.

Defendants in SLAPP actions can move under CPLR § 3211(g) for pre-answer dismissal or under CPLR § 3212(h) for accelerated summary judgment. Filing the motion triggers a mandatory stay of all discovery, motions, and other proceedings pending the court's ruling. The stay prevents the plaintiff from imposing discovery burden on the defendant during the motion's pendency.

To defeat the motion, the plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating that the action has a "substantial basis in law" by producing admissible evidence sufficient to support the claim. If the plaintiff cannot meet that burden, the court must grant the motion. The standard tilts substantially in the defendant's favor and operates as a meaningful screening mechanism for speech-related claims.

Civil Rights Law § 70-a creates a separate cause of action available to defendants who succeed on the special motion. Three remedies are available: mandatory recovery of attorney's fees and costs under § 70-a(1)(a); compensatory damages under § 70-a(1)(b) where the defendant establishes that the action was commenced or continued for the purpose of harassing, intimidating, punishing, or otherwise maliciously inhibiting the free exercise of speech, petition, or association rights; and punitive damages under § 70-a(1)(c) on a showing that the action was commenced or continued for the sole purpose of such harassment, intimidation, or punishment.

Whether New York's anti-SLAPP procedural mechanisms apply in federal court sitting in diversity remains contested under Erie analysis. The Second Circuit held in La Liberte v. Reid (2020) that California's anti-SLAPP special-motion-to-strike procedure does not apply in federal court because it conflicts with FRCP 12 and 56. New York's 2020 expanded framework largely tracks California's structure, and similar Erie reasoning has been applied by federal district courts to New York's special motion procedure. The substantive provisions, including the broadened scope of protected speech and the § 70-a damages cause of action, are more likely to apply in federal court because they do not conflict with federal procedural rules. Practitioners should assess forum selection carefully when speech-related claims are involved.