California

Personal injury and wrongful death claims must be filed within two years of accrual under CCP § 335.1. This two-year period applies broadly to negligence-based tort claims, intentional tort claims resulting in personal injury, and most categories of bodily harm. Property damage to real and personal property follows a three-year period under CCP § 338(b)-(c).

Medical malpractice operates on a distinctive shorter framework under CCP § 340.5: one year from when the plaintiff discovered or should have discovered the injury, with a three-year outside maximum from the date of injury. Certain exceptions extend the three-year cap (fraud, intentional concealment, presence of a foreign body). The combined one-year-discovery-plus-three-year-cap structure requires accelerated intake for medical malpractice matters.

Written contract claims must be filed within four years of breach under CCP § 337. Oral contract claims have a two-year period under CCP § 339, half the written-contract period. California's two-year oral contract period is among the shorter periods in the country, requiring careful attention to whether the contractual relationship was reduced to writing. UCC sale-of-goods claims follow a four-year period from breach under California Commercial Code § 2725.

Fraud claims must be filed within three years of accrual under CCP § 338(d), with the discovery rule providing that accrual is delayed until the plaintiff discovered or should have discovered the facts constituting the fraud. The discovery rule is particularly important in latent fraud cases and undermines defendants' attempts to rely on the formal date of the fraudulent transaction.

Defamation (libel and slander) must be filed within one year of publication under CCP § 340(c). This shortened period requires accelerated intake for defamation matters, parallel to New York's one-year defamation SOL but distinct from the broader two-year tort period under CCP § 335.1.

Statutory liability claims (those created by statute rather than common law) follow a three-year period under CCP § 338(a). This category includes California False Claims Act actions, qui tam matters under state statutes, and various consumer protection statutes that create private rights of action.

California Government Claims Act claim presentation requirements (covered separately) impose additional procedural deadlines that operate alongside these SOL periods when defendants include public entities. Missing the Government Claims Act presentation deadline can bar the claim independently of the underlying SOL period.

California's tort fault framework is pure comparative, established by the California Supreme Court in Li v. Yellow Cab Co. (1975). The court abandoned the prior contributory negligence rule in favor of a pure comparative system: a plaintiff's recovery is diminished by their percentage of fault, but not barred regardless of percentage. A plaintiff found 99 percent at fault still recovers one percent of their damages.

California's pure comparative framework was adopted by judicial decision rather than statute, distinguishing it from states like New York (CPLR § 1411) where pure comparative fault is codified. The Li framework has been refined through subsequent decisions including American Motorcycle Association v. Superior Court (1978), which established comparative indemnity among joint tortfeasors and partially modified the pre-Li joint and several liability rules.

Proposition 51 (1986) added Civil Code § 1431.2, which imposes several-only liability for non-economic damages (pain and suffering, emotional distress, loss of consortium). Each defendant is liable only for their proportionate share of non-economic damages, not for damages allocated to other tortfeasors. The reform was a significant departure from the prior framework, which imposed joint and several liability across both economic and non-economic categories.

Economic damages (medical expenses, lost wages, property damage) remain jointly and severally liable. The Proposition 51 several-liability framework was a significant tort reform that shifted California from full joint-and-several liability to a hybrid structure with different rules for economic and non-economic categories. The practical effect is that defendants with small fault percentages face limited exposure for pain and suffering but full exposure for medical and economic damages.

Apportionment includes all parties who contributed to the injury, including settled and absent tortfeasors. DaFonte v. Up-Right, Inc. (1992) established that fault may be allocated to non-party tortfeasors for purposes of Proposition 51 several liability calculations. This means a defendant can argue that fault should be allocated to someone not present at trial, reducing that defendant's share of non-economic damages. The doctrine creates significant case-management implications, including discovery aimed at establishing third-party fault even where the plaintiff has not named those parties.

California's Government Claims Act under Government Code § 910 et seq. requires written claim presentation to a public entity before any lawsuit can be filed. For personal injury, wrongful death, or damage to personal property, the claim must be presented within six months of accrual under Gov't Code § 911.2. For all other claims, including contract claims, the deadline is one year from accrual.

The claim must contain specified information under Gov't Code § 910 including the claimant's name and address, the date and place of the occurrence, a general description of the indebtedness or obligation, the name of the public employee causing the injury, and the amount claimed (subject to disclosure rules under § 910(f) for claims exceeding $10,000). The claim must be presented to the appropriate office of the entity, typically the clerk or designated officer identified in the entity's claim procedures.

Late claim relief is available under Gov't Code § 911.4 by application to the public entity, which must be made within a reasonable time but no later than one year after accrual. The entity may grant or deny the application. On denial, the claimant may petition the court for relief from the claim presentation requirement under Gov't Code § 946.6.

Courts grant relief based on factors including mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; whether the late claim would prejudice the entity; and whether the applicant acted with reasonable diligence. Late claim relief is discretionary and not automatic, and many late-claim applications are denied where the moving party cannot establish a credible reason for the delay or where the entity establishes prejudice.

After the public entity rejects the claim, the claimant has six months to file suit under Gov't Code § 945.6(a)(1). If the entity does not act on the claim within 45 days, the claim is deemed rejected by operation of law under § 912.4, starting the six-month suit deadline.

The Government Claims Act presentation requirement operates as a condition precedent to suit. Missing the presentation deadline bars the claim independently of the underlying SOL period. Strict compliance is required and courts apply these requirements rigorously, with limited exceptions through the late-claim procedures under § 911.4 and § 946.6.

California's inverse condemnation doctrine arises from Article I § 19 of the California Constitution, which provides that private property "shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just compensation." The "damaged" language is broader than the federal Takings Clause and reaches consequential property damage that does not involve a formal taking. This broader scope is the foundational doctrinal difference that drives California's distinctive wildfire utility liability framework.

The framework imposes strict liability on public entities and certain utilities whose public-use infrastructure causes property damage. Plaintiffs need not prove negligence or fault. Causation and damage are sufficient to establish liability. The strict-liability standard reflects the principle that the costs of public benefit should not fall disproportionately on individual property owners.

California's inverse condemnation framework was extended to investor-owned utilities by Barham v. Southern California Edison Co. (1999) and subsequent decisions including Pacific Bell Telephone Co. v. Southern California Edison Co. (2012). The reasoning: investor-owned utilities operate quasi-public infrastructure for public benefit, and the resulting property damage should be compensated under the same principles applicable to government entities.

This application has driven multi-billion-dollar damages in recent California wildfire matters involving Pacific Gas & Electric (PG&E) and Southern California Edison. The strict-liability standard makes utility-caused wildfire matters in California categorically different from negligence-based wildfire matters in states like Oregon and Washington that apply ordinary negligence theories to investor-owned utility fires. The doctrinal divide is the central framing for cross-state wildfire utility practice.

To establish inverse condemnation liability against a utility, plaintiffs must show that the utility's public-use property (transmission lines, distribution equipment) was a substantial cause of the property damage. No showing of negligence, malice, or specific intent is required. The strict-liability standard means utility maintenance and inspection practices are not directly at issue on liability, though they may be relevant to apportionment, damages enhancement, or parallel negligence claims.

Damages include restoration costs, diminution in property value, and consequential losses. Punitive damages are not available under inverse condemnation theory (which is rooted in constitutional compensation rather than tort), though parallel negligence and gross negligence claims may permit punitive recovery on traditional tort standards. The interaction between inverse condemnation and negligence claims is central to California wildfire utility litigation strategy: plaintiffs typically plead both theories, using inverse condemnation for strict liability on compensatory damages and parallel negligence theories for punitive exposure.

California's anti-SLAPP statute is codified at Code of Civil Procedure § 425.16. The statute provides for an early dispositive motion (special motion to strike) for actions arising from acts in furtherance of a person's right of petition or free speech in connection with a public issue. Categories of protected activity under § 425.16(e) include statements made before a legislative, executive, or judicial proceeding; statements made in connection with an issue under consideration by an official proceeding; statements made in a place open to the public or a public forum in connection with an issue of public interest; and other conduct in furtherance of constitutional rights of petition or free speech.

The special motion to strike must be filed within 60 days of service of the complaint, with court discretion to permit later filing in some circumstances. The motion follows a two-step framework established by Equilon Enterprises v. Consumer Cause, Inc. (2002) and subsequent cases.

At step one, the defendant bears the burden of showing that the challenged claim arises from protected activity within § 425.16(e). At step two (only if step one is satisfied), the plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating a probability of prevailing on the claim by producing admissible evidence sufficient to support a verdict in the plaintiff's favor. The framework is more demanding for plaintiffs than the FRCP 12(b)(6) plausibility standard, requiring actual evidentiary submission rather than mere pleading sufficiency.

Baral v. Schnitt (2016) clarified that the motion can be used against discrete claims or theories within a mixed cause of action, not just against entire causes of action. This expanded the practical reach of anti-SLAPP motions in complex pleadings where some allegations are speech-related and others are not.

Filing the special motion triggers a mandatory stay of all discovery pending the court's ruling under § 425.16(g). The court may permit specified discovery on motion for good cause, but the default is no discovery during motion pendency. The stay shifts the litigation timeline substantially toward early dispositive resolution.

Fee-shifting is asymmetric under § 425.16(c)(1). A prevailing defendant is entitled to recover attorney's fees and costs on a mandatory basis. A prevailing plaintiff is entitled to fees only if the court finds the motion was frivolous or solely intended to cause unnecessary delay. This asymmetry strongly incentivizes early dispositive motions by defendants and discourages plaintiffs from pursuing weak speech-related claims.

California's anti-SLAPP statute has been a testbed for federal-court Erie analysis. The Ninth Circuit held in U.S. ex rel. Newsham v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co. (1999) that California's special motion to strike applies in federal court diversity actions, treating the procedure as substantive for Erie purposes. The Ninth Circuit has continued to permit anti-SLAPP motions in federal court through subsequent cases, with refinements on the procedural application. This contrasts with the Second Circuit's later decision in La Liberte v. Reid (2020), which held that the California procedure conflicts with FRCP 12 and 56 and does not apply in federal court. Practitioners should consult the Ninth Circuit jurisprudence in California-bound federal matters and recognize the existing circuit split as the issue continues to develop.

California's first-party insurance bad faith doctrine arises from the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing inherent in every insurance contract. Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Insurance Co. (1979) established that an insurer's breach of the covenant in handling a first-party claim gives rise to tort liability beyond pure contract damages. The doctrine recognizes that insurance contracts involve a special relationship of trust and that the insurer's wrongful conduct can cause harm distinct from the unpaid policy benefit itself.

To establish bad faith, the insured must show that the insurer's denial or delay of coverage was unreasonable and without proper cause. The genuine dispute doctrine (Chateau Chamberay Homeowners Association v. Associated International Insurance Co., 2001) provides a defense where the insurer's position was based on a genuine dispute about coverage, even if the insurer's position was ultimately incorrect on the merits.

California Insurance Code § 790.03(h) enumerates sixteen categories of unfair claim settlement practices that may inform bad faith analysis. Categories include misrepresenting policy provisions, failing to acknowledge claim communications promptly, failing to conduct reasonable investigations, failing to attempt good faith settlement when liability is reasonably clear, and similar conduct that constitutes unfair practice in the claims handling context.

Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman's Fund Insurance Companies (1988) held that § 790.03 does not create a private right of action for third parties, overruling the prior decision in Royal Globe Insurance Co. v. Superior Court (1979). First-party claimants retain bad faith remedies through the implied covenant theory rather than through § 790.03 directly, but the § 790.03 categories continue to inform what constitutes unreasonable conduct under bad faith analysis.

First-party bad faith damages include the unpaid policy benefits (contract damages), consequential damages flowing from the wrongful denial or delay (such as additional financial harm and emotional distress), and punitive damages where the insurer's conduct meets the malice, oppression, or fraud standard of Civil Code § 3294 (clear and convincing evidence).

Brandt fees are a distinctive California feature established by Brandt v. Superior Court (1985): an insured who prevails on a bad faith claim may recover the attorney's fees incurred in pursuing the contract benefits, treated as consequential damages flowing from the bad faith conduct. This effectively converts bad faith litigation into a fee-shifting context even though California generally follows the American Rule on attorney's fees, providing significant additional financial leverage in bad faith matters.

The Northern District of California has become the principal federal venue for utility-caused wildfire subrogation litigation arising from Pacific Gas & Electric Company (PG&E) fire-related events. Major fires including the Tubbs Fire (2017), Camp Fire (2018), Kincade Fire (2019), Dixie Fire (2021), and subsequent events have generated substantial subrogation activity in N.D. Cal. as out-of-state insurance carriers pursue recovery against PG&E and related defendants under diversity jurisdiction.

The court's wildfire docket has been substantially shaped by PG&E's 2019 Chapter 11 bankruptcy filing in N.D. Cal. and the subsequent 2020 Plan of Reorganization, which established the Fire Victim Trust as a recovery vehicle for individual fire victims. Subrogation claims by insurance carriers operate under a separate recovery framework, with cases continuing in N.D. Cal. for both pre-bankruptcy and post-bankruptcy claims subject to the Plan's terms and any ongoing reorganization considerations.

N.D. Cal. has developed coordinated case management practices for wildfire subrogation matters arising from common fire events. Cases arising from the same fire event are frequently consolidated under FRCP 42(a) for pretrial purposes, with lead case structures, coordinated discovery schedules, common deposition protocols, and shared expert work product across related actions. The consolidated approach reduces duplication where many separate carriers are pursuing parallel claims against PG&E and related defendants.

ESI protocols in wildfire subrogation matters typically address utility operational data including transmission line maintenance records, vegetation management documents, weather forecasting data, infrastructure inspection records, historical fire-event correspondence, and regulatory communications with the California Public Utilities Commission. The volume and complexity of utility ESI in wildfire matters drives substantial early-stage case management attention, with preservation orders, search methodology negotiations, and production format specifications addressed at initial case management conferences.

California's inverse condemnation doctrine under Article I § 19 of the California Constitution applies in N.D. Cal. proceedings as substantive state law under Erie principles. The Barham v. Southern California Edison framework extending strict-liability inverse condemnation to investor-owned utilities applies in federal diversity cases against PG&E, giving plaintiffs the same theoretical liability framework available in California state court. Federal court application preserves the strict-liability framework rather than substituting a federal negligence standard.

Practitioners typically plead inverse condemnation alongside parallel negligence and gross negligence claims. The inverse condemnation theory provides strict liability for compensatory damages without proof of fault. The parallel negligence and gross negligence claims provide the vehicle for punitive damages, which are not available under the constitutional inverse condemnation theory itself. Hybrid pleading is the standard approach for utility-caused wildfire claims in N.D. Cal. subrogation matters.

Many California wildfire matters proceed in parallel between federal court and state court under California's Judicial Council Coordination Proceedings (JCCP) framework. Insurance carrier subrogation cases often run in N.D. Cal. while individual plaintiff cases coordinate in state court under JCCP. Coordination of discovery, depositions, and expert work between the two forums is a significant case management challenge, frequently requiring inter-court coordination orders, parallel discovery scheduling, and reciprocal use of deposition transcripts and expert reports across forums.

Forum selection in wildfire subrogation matters involves considerations of jury composition, judge experience with prior wildfire dockets, scheduling predictability, the bankruptcy and Plan of Reorganization framework for PG&E-related claims, and the strategic implications of running parallel federal and state proceedings against the same utility defendant. Sophisticated carriers and utility defendants generally develop positions on forum preference based on prior wildfire docket experience and the procedural mechanisms most advantageous to their position.