Massachusetts

Personal injury claims must be filed within three years of accrual under G.L. c. 260 § 2A. This three-year period applies broadly to negligence-based tort claims and intentional tort claims resulting in personal injury. Wrongful death claims must be filed within three years of date of death under G.L. c. 229 § 2. The three-year tort framework parallels New York and is more generous than the two-year periods in Colorado, Texas, Georgia, Illinois, and Florida (post-HB 837).

Medical malpractice operates under a three-year period under G.L. c. 260 § 4, beginning when the cause of action accrues, with a seven-year statute of repose. The discovery rule applies to medical malpractice claims, providing that accrual is delayed until the plaintiff knew or should have known of the harm and its causal relationship to the negligent conduct. The seven-year repose period is among the longer outer caps in the catalog, more generous than California's three-year, Illinois's four-year, or Georgia's five-year repose frameworks but shorter than Texas's ten-year repose.

Both written and oral contract claims must be filed within six years of breach under G.L. c. 260 § 2. Massachusetts applies the same six-year period to written and oral contracts, parallel to New York's framework and unlike states (such as Illinois with its ten-year written / five-year oral split or California with its four-year written / two-year oral split) that distinguish between the two. UCC sale-of-goods claims follow a four-year period from breach under G.L. c. 106 § 2-725.

Fraud claims must be filed within three years of accrual under G.L. c. 260 § 2A, with the discovery rule providing that accrual is delayed until the plaintiff discovered or should have discovered the fraud through reasonable diligence. The three-year fraud period is shorter than New York's six-year-or-two-from-discovery framework but operationally aligned with most other catalog states.

Defamation (libel and slander) operates under the same three-year tort period under G.L. c. 260 § 2A. Massachusetts's three-year defamation period is distinctive among the firm's service area states: most jurisdictions impose shortened one-year periods for defamation (NY, CA, DC, GA, IL, CO, TX), Florida uses two years, and New Mexico uses three years. The longer Massachusetts period provides more time for defamation matters to develop and is plaintiff-favorable compared to most other catalog states.

Chapter 93A consumer protection claims have a four-year statute of limitations under G.L. c. 260 § 5A. The Chapter 93A framework (covered separately) provides broad consumer protection remedies including treble damages and attorney's fees, with the four-year period applying to both individual consumer claims under c. 93A § 9 and business-to-business claims under § 11.

Massachusetts Tort Claims Act presentment requirements under G.L. c. 258 § 4 (covered separately) impose additional procedural deadlines that operate alongside these SOL periods when claims against public employers are involved. The two-year MTCA presentment requirement is longer than most state notice-of-claim periods but still operates as a condition precedent to suit. Missing the presentment deadline can bar the claim independently of the SOL period.

Massachusetts applies a modified comparative fault framework under G.L. c. 231 § 85. A plaintiff whose fault is greater than 50 percent of the total fault is barred from recovery. A plaintiff whose fault is 50 percent or less recovers damages reduced by their proportionate share of fault. The 51-percent bar framework parallels New York's (CPLR Article 16 several liability), Texas's (Chapter 33), Illinois's (§ 2-1116), Florida's (post-HB 837 § 768.81), and the modified comparative majority in other catalog states.

Massachusetts adopted modified comparative fault by statute in 1973, replacing the prior pure contributory negligence rule that had barred plaintiff recovery if the plaintiff bore any fault for the injury. The statutory adoption was part of a broader nationwide trend during the 1970s as US jurisdictions moved away from contributory negligence toward comparative fault frameworks. The Massachusetts approach (statutory modified comparative) differs from California (judicial pure comparative in Li v. Yellow Cab, 1975), New Mexico (judicial pure comparative in Bartlett, 1982), and Tennessee (judicial modified comparative in McIntyre v. Balentine, 1992).

The 1973 statute has been refined in subsequent legislative sessions to address apportionment among multiple defendants, settlement effects, and other operational issues. The current framework operates through G.L. c. 231 § 85 combined with the broader Massachusetts tort framework, including separate provisions for joint tortfeasor contribution under G.L. c. 231B.

Apportionment under G.L. c. 231 § 85 allocates fault among all parties found to bear responsibility for the injury. The trier of fact assigns specific percentages to each party, with the total summing to 100 percent. The framework operates alongside the joint tortfeasor contribution provisions of G.L. c. 231B, which govern how multiple defendants share the burden of damages awarded against them collectively.

Several liability operates as the default rule for most tort claims in Massachusetts, though joint and several liability is preserved in certain categories including intentional torts, concert of action, and specific statutory frameworks. The combination of modified comparative fault (51% bar) and several liability creates a moderately defense-favorable framework, though less aggressive than Georgia's combination of modified comparative fault with non-party apportionment and joint liability abolition.

The Massachusetts Tort Claims Act under G.L. c. 258 governs tort claims against the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, state agencies, municipalities, counties, and other public employers. Section 4 requires written presentment of the claim within two years of the date of the incident giving rise to the claim. The two-year presentment period is longer than the typical notice-of-claim periods in most catalog states (which range from 90 days in NM to six months in CA, GA, TX, and DC).

The presentment must be in writing and presented to the executive officer of the public employer. For claims against the Commonwealth, presentment is made to the Attorney General. For municipal claims, presentment is made to the city or town's chief executive officer (mayor, town manager, or similar). The presentment must contain sufficient information to allow the public employer to investigate the claim, including identification of the incident, the alleged negligence or wrongful conduct, and the resulting injuries or damages.

After presentment, the public employer has six months to respond. If the employer denies the claim or fails to respond within six months, the claim is deemed denied and the plaintiff may file suit. The six-month wait period operates as an additional procedural step that delays the filing of any lawsuit and provides the public employer an opportunity to investigate, settle, or formally deny the claim before litigation begins.

The presentment requirement operates as a condition precedent to suit. Missing the two-year presentment deadline bars the claim regardless of the underlying merits or the SOL period under G.L. c. 260 § 2A. The Massachusetts framework is one of the more flexible state notice frameworks in terms of timing, but content requirements are still important and content failures can bar the claim. Practitioners should err toward over-specification in presentment to ensure adequate notice.

Section 2 of the MTCA imposes a $100,000 cap on damages recoverable against public employers for ordinary negligence claims. The cap applies per individual claimant and substantially limits recovery against governmental defendants even where the underlying damages are significant. The cap can be exceeded only in certain narrow circumstances or through specific legislative action by the Massachusetts Legislature.

The combined two-year presentment requirement and $100,000 damages cap shape Massachusetts governmental tort practice substantially. The longer notice window is plaintiff-favorable, but the damages cap is significantly defense-favorable. Practitioners evaluating Massachusetts governmental tort claims must consider both the procedural presentment timeline and the substantive recovery limitations. The framework is comparable to Florida's three-year presentment / $200K-$300K caps structure under Fla. Stat. § 768.28, combining a relatively long notice period with statutory damages caps.

Massachusetts's General Laws Chapter 93A, the Consumer Protection Act, is one of the broadest and most plaintiff-favorable consumer protection frameworks in the United States. Chapter 93A prohibits unfair or deceptive acts or practices in trade or commerce, with separate provisions for individual consumers (§ 9) and business-to-business claims (§ 11). The statute operates as both a substantive prohibition and a procedural framework with distinctive pre-suit requirements and remedies.

Chapter 93A's scope is intentionally broad, reaching unfair business practices that fall outside traditional tort, contract, and statutory categories. Massachusetts courts have construed unfair or deceptive acts or practices expansively, incorporating both common-law deception standards and standards drawn from the Federal Trade Commission Act and other federal consumer protection frameworks. The breadth of Chapter 93A's substantive scope, combined with its remedial provisions, makes it one of the most operationally significant statutes in Massachusetts commercial practice.

Section 9 requires consumers seeking relief under Chapter 93A to provide written demand on the prospective defendant at least 30 days before filing suit. The demand letter must identify the claimant, reasonably describe the unfair or deceptive act or practice, and reasonably describe the injury suffered. The 30-day demand letter requirement operates as a condition precedent to filing suit under § 9.

The defendant's response to the demand letter has significant consequences. If the defendant makes a written tender of settlement within 30 days that is rejected by the claimant, and the claimant later recovers less than the tendered amount at trial, the claimant may be barred from recovering multiple damages and attorney's fees. Conversely, if the defendant fails to make a reasonable tender or makes no response, the claimant may pursue full multiple damages and fees. The demand letter framework strongly incentivizes substantive pre-suit settlement engagement.

Section 11 of Chapter 93A extends consumer protection coverage to business-to-business claims, allowing one business to sue another for unfair or deceptive acts in trade or commerce. Unlike § 9 individual consumer actions, § 11 business-to-business actions do not require a 30-day demand letter. Section 11 retains the multiple damages and attorney's fees provisions of § 9 but operates without the pre-suit demand requirement.

The § 11 framework is significant for commercial litigation practitioners because it provides a Massachusetts-specific cause of action for business disputes involving unfair or deceptive conduct that may not otherwise fit traditional contract or tort frameworks. Categories of conduct addressed under § 11 include misrepresentation in commercial dealings, breach of contract with bad faith elements, and various other business-related unfair practices.

Successful Chapter 93A claims may recover actual damages, multiple damages (two to three times actual damages on a finding of willful or knowing violation), and attorney's fees. Section 9(3) and § 11 provide for at minimum doubling and maximum trebling of actual damages on a finding of willful or knowing violation, with the multiplier determined by the trier of fact. The multiple damages provision provides significant deterrent and remedial effect.

Attorney's fees are mandatory for prevailing plaintiffs under both § 9 and § 11, providing fee-shifting comparable to California's Brandt fees in bad faith cases. The combination of broad substantive scope, mandatory pre-suit demand framework (for § 9), multiple damages, and mandatory attorney's fees makes Chapter 93A one of the most operationally significant consumer protection frameworks in the United States. The framework substantially shapes commercial litigation, insurance disputes, real estate transactions, and many other categories of Massachusetts practice that involve allegations of unfair or deceptive conduct.